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 1.0 Executive Summary 
NASA is resuming X-plane research. It plans to build a low-boom supersonic flight demonstrator 
(LBFD), an all-electric general aviation aircraft (X-57), and possibly an ultra-efficient subsonic transport 
(UEST) demonstrator. In an attempt to define what levels of risk are appropriate in piloted X-plane 
research, the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) evaluated numerous NASA, Department of 
Defense (DoD), and industry project management and risk assessment tools. Provided are the results of 
the evaluations of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5, 7120.8, and 8705.4; Langley 
Research Center (LaRC) Procedural Requirement (LPR) 7120.5; Dryden (Armstrong) Center 
Procedures S-002 and X-009; and Military Handbook 516C. Some of these were applied to the LBFD 
and X-57 aircraft. The impacts on risk of budgeting decisions and specialized flight conditions were also 
considered. None of the evaluated processes were found to be fully appropriate for governing 
experimental aircraft projects, but many useful elements were found in some of them. As such, the OCE 
offers nine recommendations: 
1. Define “Experimental Aircraft” as a classification of NASA projects and explore tailoring the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Experimental Aircraft definition and regulations for 
NASA purposes. 
2. Use the existing NASA aircraft design and airworthiness certification process to define the 
appropriate technical risk posture for NASA X-planes. 
3. Include the Health Management Technical Authority (HMTA) in the X-plane design process to 
address the unique health risks associated with X-plane operations. 
4. Hold discussions to develop consensus among the stakeholders to define “acceptable risks” early 
in the project lifecycle – at approximately Mission Concept Review.  
5. Using existing models, such as NPR 8705.4, tailor a governance model for classifying piloted  
X-plane project risks. 
6. Use military/industry/international standards for aircraft design philosophies and construction 
standards/guidelines. NASA need not develop and maintain its own. 
7. Use the NPR 7120.5/7120.8 requirements that have been tailored for use with piloted X-plane 
projects to define the appropriate programmatic risk posture. 
8. Maintain cost and schedule margins and reserves on all X-plane projects. 
9. Clearly define the risk acceptance authority to enable project decision making. For example, 
delegate risk acceptance authority to the Center Director at the Armstrong Flight Research 
Center (AFRC) for flight risks created by X-planes operating in the Dryden Aeronautical Test 
Range (DATR). 
 
  
 2.0 Problem Description and Proposed Solutions 
In aviation, the terms safety and risk are often used interchangeably, but in the flight research world they 
mean different things. In flight research, the primary motivation is to do everything possible to ensure 
mission success without compromising human safety.  That includes the flight crew, the ground 
personnel, and the public/non-participants. To keep the operational risk low, technical risk might 
increase.  Technical risk may include the possibility of a failure to meet mission objectives, failure of 
one or more aircraft systems, or maybe just the need to return to base with the mission incomplete and 
live to fly another day. 
Experimental flight often carries a higher technical risk than operational flight. Obviously, experimental 
flights are conducted with systems that are less mature and have less demonstrated reliability. There may 
be no alternative ways to do some things in an experimental flight, so redundancy among elements may 
not be possible. Because the systems and components being used are often one of a kind, they may be 
salvaged and reused from other test aircraft systems rather than being tailored the exact needs of the 
current test aircraft. When off-the-shelf components are available, they are usually either excessively or 
minimally capable rather than perfectly matched to the need as they would be if developed for a 
production aircraft, and the integration of these parts in to the system can be a challenge. Finally, as 
“experimental aircraft” implies, a production prototype will not be built that can be used, for example, as 
a structural test article. On the other hand, experimental flight can also allow mitigations that are not 
available in routine operational flight. For example, experimental flight often has real-time system 
health and performance monitoring by a team of experts within a dedicated ground control room. The 
flight envelope and other mission-specific operating limits are often restricted and flight crews rely on 
carefully constructed procedures to stay out of trouble. 
The NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) is developing a series of piloted 
experimental aircraft (X-planes) for the first time in almost 30 years. These include the LBFD which has 
been designed to fly supersonically (M=1.4) with a significantly attenuated sonic boom (Figure 1), a 
subsonic aircraft (X-57) with a distributed electric propulsion system (Figure 2), and potentially even a 
UEST which is based on hybrid wing body or blended wing body design principles (Figure 3). The work 
on the LBFD has been proceeding in partnership with the Lockheed-Martin Corporation under the Quiet 
Supersonic Technology (QueSST) project. A preliminary design review (PDR) for a demonstrator was 
held in July 2017 and a request for proposals to complete the design and build the LBFD was released in 
August 2017. The X-57 concept underwent a critical design review (CDR) in November 2016 and a 
delta-CDR in February 2017. The first flight of the initial configuration is expected in 2018 with flights 
of additional configurations to follow. Work on the UEST is currently unscheduled. 
 
Figure 1. Low-Boom Flight Demonstrator 
  
Figure 2. X-57 Distributed Electric Propulsion Demonstrator 
 
Figure 3. Ultra-Efficient Subsonic Transport 
While the LBFD and X-57 designs appear to be consistent with previous piloted experimental aircraft 
development, to date, there is no NASA Agency-level consensus on how much risk (technical and 
programmatic) is acceptable on these projects. These are high-cost, high-complexity, and high-visibility 
vehicles that will have a crew (lower risk tolerance) and require integrated system-level development. 
Still, research aircraft are experimental in nature with options to ‘Return to Field’ and fly another day in 
the event of malfunctions, so they can generally accept higher risk. In this ambiguity, a full spectrum of 
opinions have been voiced. Some stakeholders say that the lowest level of risk acceptance - NPR 8705.4 
(Ref 1) Risk Classification Class A - should be used because the vehicle has a crew and given the 
project’s high visibility and importance to the Agency, and some say the highest level of risk acceptance 
- Class D - is appropriate because the project is research. Some say something in between is appropriate 
given the unique nature of this “one-off” experimental aircraft.  Finally, some say that using NPR 
8705.4 risk classifications is inappropriate because they are not created for use in aircraft development.  
A lack of consensus exists. 
The purpose of this effort is to review NASA and DoD project management and risk analysis processes 
to see if they are useful for experimental aircraft projects. These processes will be applied to the LBFD 
and X-57 projects to determine whether the risk tolerance inherent in them is comparable to the risk 
 tolerance posture (technical and programmatic) being used by the LBFD and X-57 projects. This will 
indicate whether they are suitable for other X-plane projects working through risk management issues.  
Ultimately, the goal is to establish a common frame of reference and understanding among all NASA 
stakeholders on risk expectations for piloted flight research projects like the LBFD and X-57 projects. 
3.0 NASA X-Plane Governance 
Addressing risks requires some common language. Risk itself is defined in DCP-X-009, Armstrong 
Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process (Ref 2), as an event that could cause injury, loss, or 
damage to personnel, property, the environment, or mission accomplishment. It has an estimated 
probability of occurrence and severity of consequence. The task of identifying risks is the responsibility 
of all stakeholders, and the Project Manager manages the collection of identified risks. Different risks 
demand different levels of attention, so it is important that a system be adopted for characterizing or 
classifying the importance of the individual risks. This classification system should also be integrated 
with a system that describes the Project Manager’s responsibilities for managing and mitigating the 
different classifications of risk. Managing the risks ensures they will not be overlooked and involves 
mitigation to reduce the likelihood of undermining the project or harming individuals or property. Some 
risks cannot be eliminated completely, and it may be necessary for the Project Manager to secure 
approval to proceed with unresolved risks. This risk approval process, if it exists, should also be 
integrated with the risk classification process. The evaluations of the documents listed below, are 
conducted using these actions (identification, classification, management, and approval) related to risks. 
Numerous procedures describe ways to classify and effectively manage risk within a project 
management structure. Several procedures were reviewed and evaluated in this study including NPR 
7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook (Ref. 3), NPR 7120.8, NASA 
Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements (Ref 4), DCP-X-009, 
Armstrong Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process (Ref. 2), NPR 8705.4, Risk Classification 
for NASA Payloads (Ref. 1), MIL-HDBK-516C, Airworthiness Certification Criteria (Ref 5), DCP-S-
002, Armstrong Hazard Management Procedure (Ref. 6), LPR 7120.5, NASA Langley Space Flight 
Project Practices Handbook (Ref. 7).  In addition to these, numerous subsystem and component design, 
development, and certification standards were also considered (Refs. 8-39). 
Risk is often broken into two categories – technical and programmatic. Though the line between these 
categories is often unclear, technical risk typically involves hardware, software, facilities, analysis, and 
the abilities of individuals. Programmatic risk includes more overarching elements such as political 
priorities, plans, or resource availability. Confusion can arise when both of these contribute to the 
obstacle. For example, hardware design features may be eliminated because resources are cut or 
facilities may be made unavailable because priorities change. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to 
separate these risks in this analysis.  
3.1 Technical Risk 
3.1.1 NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook and 7120.8, 
NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Handbook 
Neither NPR 7120.5 nor NPR 7120.8 is fully appropriate for governing NASA X-plane projects.  NPR 
7120.5 was developed for spaceflight programs and NPR 7120.8 was developed for relatively low-risk 
research and technology development projects. 
 For classifying risk, NPR 7120.5 points to NPR 8705.4. For managing risk, NPR 7120.5 and 7120.8 
both point to NPR 8000.4b (Ref 40), Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, and NPR 
7120.5 also points to NASA/SP-2011-3422, NASA Risk Management Handbook (Ref 41). NPR 7120.5 
also raises the issue of engaging the expertise of the NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO) 
when issues arise related to the health of NASA personnel. Piloted operations at very high altitudes 
could generate medical issues and the CHMO should be alerted to the possible need for a HMTA.  
However, none of these NPRs or handbooks discuss the unique aspects of technical risk for 
experimental aircraft, and thus are not useful sources. 
3.1.2 NPR 8705.4, Risk Classification for NASA Payloads 
The applicability of NPR 8705.4 to New Aviation Horizons (NAH) X-plane projects was discussed 
within the ARMD Governance Working Group (GWG) and within the NASA Program and Project 
Management Board (PPMB) Tiger Team. The GWG and PPMB Tiger Team were set up to identify 
governance for the NAH projects and were populated by senior NASA managers and engineers from the 
four NASA Research Centers and offices at NASA Headquarters.  Both entertained the question of 
whether NPR 8705.4 should be applied to NASA piloted X-plane development and both recommended 
not applying it, as is, to these projects.  Both the GWG and PPMB Tiger Team completed their work 
over the course of 2016. The Tiger Team recognized that these Risk Classification definitions and the 
associated guidance were generated with spaceflight projects in mind, not aircraft, and that the 
applicability of the Risk Classification system within NPR 8705.4 should be determined during the 
design process and assessed on a case-by-case basis. That is the standard process used at AFRC and 
LaRC for research aircraft design. However, while the guidance provided in 8705.4 was not considered 
applicable to NASA experimental aircraft development, it was noted that certain generic precepts of 
Risk Classification, described in the first chapter of NPR 8705.4, should be followed. These include: 
• Risk is understood and agreed to by the program/project, Governing Program Management 
Council, Mission Directorate, and other customer(s). (NPR 8705.4 ¶ 1.1.1) 
• All parties are … able to understand the acceptable risk associated with a program or project. 
(NPR 8705.4 ¶ 1.1.2) 
• As early in the formulation process as possible, the Mission Directorate establishes the 
acceptable risk classification level (NPR 8705.4 ¶ 1.2.1) 
• The project can define and apply the appropriate design and management controls, systems 
engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, and risk management processes. (NPR 
8705.4 ¶ 1.3.1) 
• The guidelines (are) … intended to serve as a starting point for establishment of assurance 
criteria, mission design, and test programs tailored to the needs of a specific project. The intent is 
to generate discussion of implementation methodologies in order for the programs, projects, 
Centers, the Governing Program Management Council (GPMC), and the Mission Directorate to 
make informed decisions. (NPR 8705.4 ¶ 1.3.2) 
Clearly, using NPR 8705.4 involves a discussion of “acceptable risk” tolerance early in the life of a 
project, typically at the first key decision point, KDP-A. This risk tolerance is then promulgated through 
NPR 8705.4 to determine which Risk Classification should be used in conducting the project. NPR 
8705.4 was developed for spaceflight projects, though, and is not required for use by the NASA aircraft 
community, so this discussion has not historically occurred on ARMD projects. As a research portfolio, 
 ARMD projects normally carry higher inherent risk and could benefit from the understanding and 
commitment this early discussion generates. 
When considering the usefulness of the Risk Classifications in NPR 8705.4, two sets of evaluation 
criteria are provided for characterizing risk. One addresses Technical Risk attributes and the other 
addresses Programmatic Risks (see Section 3.2.3). The Programmatic Risk attributes are listed below. 
These are described in NPR 8705.4 as “safety, mission assurance, design, and test” risks. 
• Single point failure acceptability 
• Engineering model, Prototype model, and Flight and Spare hardware availability 
• Qualification, Acceptance, and Protoflight Test Program planned 
• EEE1 parts use 
• Reviews planned 
• Materials characterizations/experience availability 
• Compliance with Reliability NPD 8720.1 – Level of failure effects analysis that is available 
• Level of Fault Tree Analysis that is available 
• Maintainability requirements 
• Compliance with Quality Assurance NPD 8730.5 
• Software Verification and Validation requirements 
• Compliance with Risk Management NPR 8000.4b 
• Telemetry Coverage for mission critical events 
While NPR 8705.4 as a whole is not considered applicable to NASA’s piloted X-planes, the above 
design criteria are examples of design aspects that should be considered in the development of 
experimental aircraft.  Appendix A describes how the LBFD project is approaching these criteria.  
Furthermore, it was noted that there are likely similar design criteria to those discussed in 8705.4 that, 
while not included, are good design criteria applicable to aircraft development.  Those aircraft-specific 
design criteria should be identified. 
3.1.3 MIL-HDBK-516C, Airworthiness Certification Criteria 
As there is no NASA-owned technical standard for airworthiness certification, the MIL-HDBK-516C 
was investigated for applicability.  This DoD standard provides the airworthiness authority in all 
branches of the service with criteria to determine the airworthiness of all air vehicles including, but not 
limited to, manned or unmanned, fixed or rotary wing. Users are encouraged to tailor the entire set of 
criteria to a set that is applicable to the airworthiness of the aircraft system being assessed. Following the 
tailoring rules provided in the document, such a tailoring was performed for the LBFD. Table 1 shows 
the results as described at PDR. Nearly 40% of the criteria in MIL-HDBK-516C were found to not apply 
to this technology demonstrator. The tailoring of the criteria contained within MIL-HDBK-516C is 
                                                 
1 NASA's Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts discipline seeks to evaluate newly available and advanced 
electronic parts for NASA programs and projects and maximize effectiveness and efficiency by collaborating with industry 
and other agencies. 
 based on three factors: 1) the subject matter of the criterion, 2) how high or low the safety bar needs to 
be set for success, and 3) the methodology used to verify compliance. 
Table 1. MIL-HDBK-516C Tailoring for LBFD 
 
 
3.1.4 DCP-S-002, Armstrong Hazard Management Procedure 
This NASA procedure applies to the aerospace and ground systems for which AFRC assumes ground, range, 
flight safety, or mission success responsibility. It includes all elements of flight research operations. At a 
minimum, the test article or vehicle, support subsystems or vehicles, and ground research capabilities 
are included unless specifically waived by the Independent Technical Authority or by the AFRC Center 
Director.  
Risk assessment within this process is based on two matrices that assess the probability and severity of 
any possible mishap. The combination of the probability and severity associated with a possible mishap 
is designated a risk. This document defines a mishap as “an unexpected, unforeseen, or unintended event 
that causes injury, loss, or damage to personnel, equipment, property, the environment, or mission 
accomplishment.” The two matrices are presented in Figure 4. One deals with the impact of a mishap on 
the loss of a valuable asset and the other deals with injury or even the loss of human life. They differ in 
the level of approval required to accept specific levels of risk. Within DCP-S-002, the bounds on the 
different categories of both Probability and Severity are defined. 
  
Figure 4. DCP-S-002 Human Injury Risk Assessment Matrix and Asset/Mission Risk Assessment Matrix 
3.1.5 DCP-X-009, AFRC Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process 
DCP-X-009 (Ref 2) defines the process by which reviews are used to approve all flight activities and 
hazardous ground tests at AFRC, as well as testing involving AFRC personnel using non-NASA 
facilities. For airworthiness and safety matters, it recommends that G-7900.3-001 (Ref 42) be used as 
guidance. 
G-7900.3-001 advises reviewers to consider all aspects of the project including personnel, process and 
execution, technology, and technical areas, but it provides no guidance for how the areas should be 
judged. Risk Management falls under the heading of Process and Execution and G-7900.3-001 simply 
advises that the following elements should be evaluated: 
 Assessment of residual risk 
 Accepted Risk list 
 Risk/Hazard identification 
 Severity and Probability matrix 
 Pre-mishap contingency plan 
 Pre-declared risk list 
Though this is a good place to start in evaluating how much attention a Project Manager has given to 
Risk Management, it is not an exhaustive list. It neither provides objective criteria for the evaluation nor 
describes what levels of risk are acceptable. Elements such as the Severity and Probability matrix must 
be found in other documents. Terms such as “residual risk” and “pre-declared risk” are undefined. As an 
advisory document, G-7900.3-001 is useful, but it must be used in partnership with other unspecified 
documents. 
3.1.6 Unique Hazards 
Most X-planes will also have unique hazards that will require risk analysis beyond any standard process 
used in the development of other aircraft. Communication is the key to addressing these unique 
challenges. Some level of risk must be accepted, and the goal is consensus among the stakeholders about 
 the appropriate level of risk.  As described in Reference 1, that consensus should be reached early in the 
design process before options are eliminated. 
3.2 Programmatic Risk 
Some risks are unrelated to the technology development, hardware, or conduct of the experiment. A 
project can also fail because of management issues such as poor planning, inappropriate resource 
allocation, and unforeseen obstacles. These are programmatic risks. Several guides and procedures 
address these types of risks. 
3.2.1 NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook and 7120.8, 
NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Handbook 
Though the preface of NPR 7120.5 describes it as being applicable only to spaceflight projects, the 
document offers programmatic risk management practices that may be equally applicable when 
developing a risk management system for experimental aircraft. It describes NASA-specific program 
and project management language and practices in detail. Those descriptions emphasize the need for 
scheduling periodic external project reviews and for building margin and reserve into resource and 
performance plans. 
As the title implies, NPR 7120.5 (Ref 3) was not developed for experimental aircraft projects but it does 
outline that:  
 2.4.4. Mission Directorates shall plan and budget tightly coupled and single-project programs 
(regardless of life-cycle cost) and projects with an estimated life-cycle cost greater than $250 
million based on a 70 percent joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL), or as approved by 
the Decision Authority. 
 2.4.4.1. Any JCL approved by the Decision Authority at less than 70 percent shall be justified 
and documented. 
 2.4.4.2. Mission Directorates shall ensure funding for these projects is consistent with the 
Management Agreement and in no case less than the equivalent of a 50 percent JCL. 
NPR 7120.8 states that it is applicable to all NASA Research and Technology projects not covered 
under NPR 7120.5 and which are not Infrastructure or IT projects. It is generally applied to projects 
smaller than $250M, though, and even suggests that large-scale projects follow the management 
practices required in NPR 7120.5. Both the GWG and PPMB Tiger Team mentioned in Section 3.1.2 
advised that the appropriate Project Management approach for NAH X-planes appears to be a 
combination of the management rigor of NPR 7120.5 and the technology development focus of NPR 
7120.8. 
3.2.2 LPR 7120.5, NASA Langley Space Flight Project Practices Handbook 
As was the case for NPR 7120.5, LPR 7120.5 (Ref 7) was developed with spaceflight projects in mind. 
Still, it provides good guidance for reducing programmatic risk. LPR 7120.5 states: 
 The Project shall include reserves in the cost estimate based on assessed implementation risk. 
The standard level of reserves is 30 percent at the time of PDR, and a waiver is required for a 
smaller level of reserves in the cost estimate. The Center will not allow less than 15 percent 
reserves at the time of PDR. 
  Projects shall include funded schedule margin along the critical path of the Integrated Master 
Schedule. Guidance for funded schedule reserve margin that should be validated by assessment 
of implementation risk is: 
– Formulation through subsystem development = 1 month margin per year 
– System integration and testing through delivery to launch site (or storage) = 2 months 
margin per year 
3.2.3 NPR 8705.4, Risk Classification for NASA Payloads 
In addition to the technical risks categories described in Section 3.1.2, NRR 8705.4 also provides a 
matrix for assessing more programmatic risks. They are described as defining “risk combinations for 
NASA payloads by considering such factors as criticality to the Agency Strategic Plan, national 
significance, availability of alternative research opportunities, success criteria, magnitude of investment, 
and other relevant factors.” Figure 5 shows the NPR 8705.4 Risk Characterization model applied to the 
LBFD and the X-57. While this application represents the judgement of the author and required a 
subjective interpretation of the intent of each category and the associated descriptors to apply this 
spacecraft tool to experimental aircraft, it is intended to show that not all piloted X-plane projects are the 
same. While they are both piloted X-planes, the LBFD and the X-57 may fall within different risk 
classifications using the definitions in this matrix. Though the LBFD is planned to cost ~$400M and to 
operate at M=1.4 over public lands, the X-57 is planned to cost only ~$30M and to operate at just 150 
knots within the confines of the DATR. It is appropriate that their risks are different. 
 
Figure 5. Author’s Estimates of NPR 8705.4 Applied to LBFD and X-57 
Apparent in this risk matrix is the emphasis on spacecraft. For example, most spacecraft are not 
serviceable after launch so the possibility of performing “In-Flight Maintenance” significantly affects 
the likelihood of mission success. Aircraft, however, are available for service before and after every 
flight, even though “In-Flight Maintenance” may not be a desirable design feature. “Launch 
Constraints” also have little meaning. That attribute appears to be asking the question, “How narrow is 
the time window in which this research must be done?” It aims to assess whether schedule slips will 
 destroy the entire project. Finally, “Mission Lifetime” is more an assessment of the reliability that has 
been built into the system. The comparable mission lifetime for an experimental aircraft may be an hour 
(beyond that, many things can be serviced) or it may be the 1000-hour service life designed into 
components that are more difficult to service, such as the primary structure and engine bearings. On the 
other hand, because these aircraft are piloted, there is a new need for aircraft specific reliability not 
covered in NPR 8705.4. As a result of this difference in needs, LaRC has mapped the NPR 8705.4 Risk 
Classification criteria into a set more applicable to flight-test aircraft. That assessment matrix was 
applied to the LBFD in 2014 and again in 2017 (Fig 6). The risk classification can be seen to change 
from 2014 to 2017. As the priority of the work grew within ARMD, as alternative ways of conducting 
the research decreased, and as the risks associated with achieving mission success became better 
understood, the overall risk assessment increased. 
Figure 6. Evolving QueSST Perspectives on Risk from Spring 2014 to Summer 2017  
(using the LaRC tailoring tool) 
3.2.4 De-Scope Strategies 
If resources are set and reserves are exhausted, it may be necessary to reduce the scope of a project. This 
should be performed with great care and should be based on a prioritization of the project objectives 
performed early in the project planning. 
3.2.5 Project Review 
It is important to build regular reviews into project schedules to ensure that the project team does not 
become too narrowly focused. Day-to-day challenges can draw attention to near-term concerns at the 
expense of maintaining a big-picture perspective. Occasionally, events outside the project can increase 
or decrease the importance or urgency of the project goals. Outside reviews can return the focus to an 
appropriate balance, even if only momentarily. These reviews should be scheduled with line 
management and with members of the broader stakeholder community. 
 4.0 Risk Management Lessons Applied to LBFD 
Following the consideration of the risk management references, the Integrated Aviation Systems 
Program (IASP) within the NASA’s Aeronautics Mission Directorate has developed the LBFD 
governance model. Largely, that was by tailoring both NPR 7120.5 (Ref 3) and NPR 7120.8 (Ref 4, as 
applicable, and adding elements to address experimental aircraft development not found in these NPRs. 
Specifically, these additional elements address airworthiness certification and were drawn from the 
Dryden Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Process (Ref 4). This Governance and Decision 
Authority approach was approved by the NASA Agency Program Management Council on July 19, 
2017. 
4.1 Project Documentation 
Part of effective communication is extensive documentation. Since the LBFD project was born of the 
QueSST project, considerable documentation existed that represented consensus among the 
stakeholders. It would be wasteful to abandon these documents without good cause. These documents 
include, among others: 
• Project Management Plan 
• Concept of Operations 
• Requirements Documents 
(system/subsystem) 
• Configuration Management Plan 
• Risk Management Plan 
• Configuration Control Board Charter 
• Security Plan 
• System Acceptance Plan 
• Systems Engineering Management Plan 
• Aircraft Requirements and Assumptions 
• Airworthiness Requirements and Criteria 
• Software Management Plan 
• Life Support to Aircraft Interface Control 
Document 
• Airworthiness Certification Plan 
• Safety and Mission Assurance Plan 
• System Safety Plan 
• Quality Assurance Plan 
• Mishap Preparedness/Contingency Plan 
 
4.2 Project Reviews 
Extensive reporting and review requirements have been built into the LBFD Plan to minimize 
programmatic risk. This project oversight and insight includes: 
• Program/Center: 
– Key Decision Points (as required) 
– IASP Tag-up (every 2 weeks) 
– ARMD Quarterly Status Review (4 times a year) 
– ARMD Annual Review (annually, if no KDP that year) 
– Integrated Center Management Council (monthly) 
– IEPTR (Integrated Engineering Project Technical Review (monthly) 
• Project (QueSST structure): 
– Project Management Review Board (monthly) 
– Engineering Review Board (TBD) 
– Project Configuration Control Board (CCB) (monthly) 
– Project RMB (monthly) 
– Aircraft CCB (TBD) 
– Engineering Tag-up (TBD) 
• AFRC Airworthiness Certification process 
– Flight Readiness Review (FRR) (~3 months prior to first flight) 
 – Airworthiness & Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB) (6-10 weeks prior to first flight) 
– Tech Brief (~2 days prior to first flight) 
4.3 Resource Management 
ARMD created an Inter-Center Planning Team for the transition from the QueSST project  to the LBFD 
project. Among other things, the team explored best practices for program and project management and 
considered how those might be applied to the LBFD project. Resource management was a main topic 
and the team recommended that funding to 50% JCL (Ref 43) and a 15% reserve (both contract and in-
house) and 5 months funded schedule reserve should be secured before baselining the budget.  In this 
context, margin and reserve are defined as follows: 
• Margin is schedule and budget conservatism built into the plan to allow for “known” uncertainties. 
• Reserve is resource conservatism built into the plan to allow for “unknown” uncertainties (things that 
cannot be predicted). 
“Establish adequate program reserves—and double them.” 
– Vince Rausch, X-43 Project Manager 
“Eliminate zero margin concept – establish risk and uncertainty reserves.” 
– Fay Collier, ERA Project Manager 
4.4 De-Scope Plans 
The primary technology being investigated by the LBFD project is the outer mold line (OML) of the 
aircraft and the LBFD Project Plan development effort is focused on meeting this primary objective 
while minimizing all other areas. As such, very few technologies can be abandoned without adding 
increased risk to the project. Nevertheless, the LBFD Project Office will be required to develop a de-
scope strategy prior to the KDP-C, at which time the project’s plans will be confirmed and baselined. 
This de-scope strategy will be important to the success of the project in the event resources are 
consumed more rapidly than anticipated. 
4.5 Decision Making Authority 
It is important, when accepting the responsibility for project results, to understand where the decision-
making authority rests. Overall decision authority for the LBFD has been delegated to the ARMD 
Associate Administrator by the NASA Associate Administrator. Risk acceptance should follow. Safety 
risk is typically delegated to the AFRC Center Director, who formally accepts the risk for all test flights, 
both in restricted airspace and in FAA-controlled airspace. NPR 7900.3D, “Aircraft Operations 
Management Manual,” requires that aircraft be certified airworthy under the authority of the Center 
Director through a Certificate of Airworthiness Process. Both Phase 1 (Initial Airworthiness and 
Envelope Expansion) and Phase 2 (Initial Acoustic Response) of the LBFD Project will be conducted in 
restricted airspace (DATR). Phase 3 is planned to be conducted in FAA-controlled, but unrestricted, 
Class A airspace above 55,000 ft. over populated areas. NPR 8000.4b, Agency Risk Management 
Procedural Requirements states: 
– 2.3.4 When there is risk to humans, the actual Risk Takers (e.g., astronauts) (or official 
spokesperson[s] and official supervisory chain) are accountable for consenting to assume the 
risk. 
Note: The NASA Administrator is the official Agency spokesperson to consent to any exposure 
to human safety or property risk on behalf of the general public. 
 It has not yet been determined how far risk acceptance authority will be delegated. The rationale for 
maintaining that authority at the NASA Associate Administrator level is based on the following 
considerations. 
 The inclusion of a human on board raises the risk of the project to the agency level in all 
phases of the project. 
 Piloted X-planes will garner nationwide interest, especially for anomalies. 
 Many legacy subsystems will be used which were not originally rated for the QueSST/LBFD 
flight parameters. 
The rationale for maintaining risk acceptance authority at Center Director level is based on the following 
considerations: 
 Flight envelope will be flight-tested and set, with practiced operational test flights rehearsed in 
restricted areas before going out for operational runs. 
 The mission profile of the flights is benign, straight and level at a constant Mach number. 
 NASA aircraft presently fly in FAA-controlled airspace. 
The uncertainty surrounding this decision-making authority must be resolved before the project 
proceeds. 
4.6 Unique Hazards 
Because of the requirement that the LBFD conduct sustained flight at M=1.4, flight testing requires both 
a large test area and an area free of slower traffic. The aerothermodynamics at high altitudes also 
contribute to sonic boom attenuation. The LBFD will, therefore, be flown in the airspace above 
commercial transports between 55,000 ft. and 58,000 ft. above mean sea level. Flight above 50,000 ft. 
requires that the cockpit be pressurized to no higher than 25,000 ft. equivalent air pressure and that the 
crew wear partial-pressure suits and use supplemental oxygen. No commercially available partial 
pressure suits and oxygen regulation systems exist for operations above 50,000 ft. except those that use 
emergency oxygen generation systems known as on board oxygen generation systems (OBOGS). These 
have historically been unreliable.  To avoid problems with OBOGS, the design of the LBFD 
supplemental oxygen system will use bottled liquid oxygen (LOX). The seal that will maintain cockpit 
pressure at 25,000 ft. comes from the T-38 and is not currently qualified for operations above 50,000 ft. 
The approach being taken by the project team is to ensure that cabin pressure can be maintained at or 
below 25,000 ft. equivalent air pressure while operating at altitudes between 55,000 ft. and 58,000 ft. 
Because the cockpit is a small volume, small leaks will be significant. As a second line of defense, a 
qualified Pilot Life Support ensemble must be identified or developed. Such a system would include a 
pressure suit and LOX with a regulator all capable of supporting ejection at approved altitudes. As an 
additional line of defense, the cabin pressure will be monitored and the pilot will be alerted to low 
pressure using an integrated caution, alerting, and warning system and panel cockpit display guiding a 
manual descent to a lower altitude. 
The design and verification efforts needed for systems such as these include: 
1) A cockpit pressurization schedule must be designed such that cockpit pressure can be maintained 
at or below 25,000 ft. altitude to support operations at LBFD mission altitudes.  
 2) A life support ensemble (partial pressure suit with LOX regulator and secondary oxygen supply) 
capable of supporting ejection at approved altitudes must be identified or developed. 
3) A cockpit pressurization monitoring system capable of alerting the pilot through ICAWS and 
panel cockpit display must be developed for a manual altitude descent initiated action. 
4) The performance of the life support ensemble must be validated through test and analysis. 
5) The performance of the cockpit pressurization system must be validated through test and 
analysis. 
This approach has been discussed with and accepted by the LBFD stakeholders. That consensus does not 
ensure mission success or guarantee safety, but it ensures that no obvious options have been overlooked 
and that everyone related to the project has had the opportunity to stop the process if they believe the 
risk to be unacceptable. 
4.7 LBFD Overall Risk Conclusions 
The LBFD Inter-Center Planning Team (ICPT) reached following the overall conclusions on risk: 
 Current budget is high risk due to the lack of reserves. 
 Robust programmatic documentation, reporting, and insight/oversight exists. 
 NPR 8705 is difficult to apply to an X-plane application. 
 The best fit for the LBFD Project is a tailored Class C/D categorization. 
In addition to the overall conclusions from the ICPT, the survey conducted for this report leads to the 
following additional conclusions: 
 Availability of cost/schedule margins and reserves will be critical to successful completion of 
this aircraft development effort. 
o While the data collected on sonic boom attenuation is for research purposes, the 
design/build of this aircraft should not be considered a research project but a more 
standard complex system-level development effort. 
o Strategy on margins and reserves is still in development. 
o For the LBFD project, conservatism may be less than for similar cost/visibility NASA 
projects because: 
 Standard manufacturing and testing processes will be used. No new materials or 
manufacturing processes are required. 
 Significant use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware/software will be possible, 
reducing development risk. 
 The mission profile is relatively low-risk compared with X-planes investigating 
new flight regimes. 
 De-scope options will be limited. 
o The technology being investigated is the aircraft OML itself. 
o The design is already simplified for cost but adequate for safety/airworthiness. 
o There are few objectives that can be removed from the project. 
 Depth of document tree and levels of oversight/insight appear to be rigorous and appropriate for 
a project of this complexity/cost/visibility. 
  Where the authority to accept risk during flight, be it with the Project Manager, Center Director, 
Mission Directorate Associate Administrator, or with the NASA Associate Administrator, is still 
undetermined and with differences of opinion. 
5.0 OCE Recommendations 
Because of this study, the NASA OCE proposed the following recommendations: 
5.1 Language 
NPR 8705.4 is not used by the NASA aircraft development community because it is primarily focused 
on spaceflight. However, those outside the NASA aircraft development community use it when 
discussing LBFD. To avoid confusion of expectations, a language is needed for the aircraft development 
community.  
OCE Recommendation: The FAA maintains a category for aircraft certification called “Experimental 
Aircraft.” Adopt “Experimental Aircraft” as a classification of NASA projects when discussing NAH X-
plane risk posture. It is not recommended that ARMD modify NPR 8705.4, rather that it continue to 
investigate the FAA Experimental Aircraft definition and regulations (and potentially DoD) and tailor 
those to NASA purposes. 
5.2 Technical Risk Management 
5.2.1 Airworthiness Certification 
The existing NASA aircraft design and airworthiness certification process is rigorous, appropriate, best-
in-class, and will produce safe aircraft that meet mission objectives within the parameters of 
“experimental aircraft.” 
OCE Recommendation: Use the inputs and outputs of that process to define the appropriate LBFD 
technical risk posture. Do not change the existing NASA aircraft design and airworthiness certification 
process. It is effective, as is. 
5.2.2 HMTA 
Experimental aircraft operations can present unique health risk that must be carefully analyzed. 
OCE Recommendation: The HMTA should participate in the LBFD design process and should be 
formally included in the LBFD project team. ARMD and HMTA should discuss ways to ensure this. 
5.2.3 Acceptable Risk 
The precepts of consensus on acceptable risk early in the project life cycle are applicable to NAH X-
planes.  
OCE Recommendation:  This type of discussion is needed at the Agency-level for each NAH project. 
Insert an AFSRB-led risk discussion at approximately the time of Mission Concept Review or KDP-A. 
5.2.4 Risk Classification 
The existing NPR 8705.4 classification categories are not applicable to experimental aircraft 
development.  
OCE Recommendation: ARMD should tailor a governance model from existing models for use with 
piloted X-plane projects conducted by the IASP. 
 5.2.5 NASA Design and Construction Standards 
Aircraft design philosophies and construction standards/guidance influence some risk decisions, yet 
NASA-owned standards are not needed. 
OCE Recommendation: MIL/industry/international standards and AFRC/LaRC institutional processes 
are sufficient. However, the process QueSST used to determine applicability and levels of those 
standards should be captured for use on future X-plane projects. 
5.3 Programmatic Risk 
5.3.1 NPR 7120.5 and NPR 7120.8 Tailoring 
ARMD conducted a thorough NPR 7120.5/7120.8 tailoring process, which has produced a set of 
programmatic requirements for NAH X-plane projects. 
OCE Recommendation: Use that requirement set to define LBFD programmatic risk posture. Other 
sources, such as the Project Manager’s Acquisition Strategy, must also be used to define specific aspects 
of LBFD programmatic risk posture. 
5.3.2 Resource Planning 
Cost and schedule margins and reserves will be critical to the success of NAH X-plane projects. 
OCE Recommendation: NAH X-plane projects should maintain cost/schedule margins and reserves. 
5.3.3 Risk Acceptance Authority 
Clear risk acceptance authority is essential for project decision making. 
OCE Recommendation: Delegate authority to the AFRC Center Director for flight risk acceptance 
while NAH X-planes are operating in restricted airspace (DATR). Initiate a broader discussion to 
determine the authority for flight risk acceptance in unrestricted airspace (National Airspace System). 
6.0 Acronyms and Nomenclature 
AA  Associate Administrator 
A/C  Aircraft 
AFRC  Armstrong Flight Research Center 
AFSRB  Airworthiness & Flight Safety Review Board 
ARMD Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate  
CCB  Configuration Control Board 
CD  Center Director 
CDR  Critical Design Review 
CE  Chief Engineer 
CHMO Chief Health and Medical Officer 
DATR  Dryden Aeronautical Test Range  
DoD  Department of Defense 
EEE  Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
ERA  Environmentally Responsible Aircraft 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FMEA/CIL Failure mode and effects analysis/critical items list  
FRR  Flight Readiness Review 
 GIDEP Government-Industry Data Exchange Program 
GPMC  Governing Program Management Council  
GWG  ARMD Governance Working Group 
HDBK  Handbook 
HMTA Health and Medical Technical Authority 
IASP  Integrated Aviation Systems Program 
ICPT  Inter-Center Planning Team 
IEPTR  Integrated Engineering Project Technical Review 
IPAO  Independent Program Assessment Office 
ITAR  International Traffic and Arms Regulations 
IV&V  Independent verification and validation 
JCL  Joint cost and schedule confidence level 
KDP-A First key decision point 
KDP-B Second key decision point 
KDP-C Third key decision point 
LaRC  NASA Langley Research Center 
LBFD  Low Boom Flight Demonstrator 
LOX  Liquid oxygen 
LPR  Langley Procedural Requirement 
M  Mach Number 
MD  Mission Directorate 
MIL  Military 
MRB  Management Review Board 
NAH  New Aviation Horizons 
NAS  National Airspace System 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NPR  NASA Procedural Requirement 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
OBOGS On-board oxygen generation system  
OCE  Office of Chief Engineer 
OML  Outer mold line 
OSMA  Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
PDR  Preliminary Design Review 
PLOA  Probability of loss of aircraft 
PM  Project Manager 
PPMB  NASA Program and Project Management Board 
QueSST Quiet Supersonic Technology 
RMB  Risk Management Board 
SCD  Source Control Drawing 
SPF  Single Point Failures 
TBD  To be determined 
TSO  Technical Standard Order 
UEST  Ultra-efficient subsonic transport 
X-planes Experimental aircraft  
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 Appendix A. Application of NPR 8705.4 Programmatic Risk Criteria to LBFD 
 
Class A Class B Class C Class D Rationale 
Single 
Point 
Failures 
(SPFs) 
Critical SPFs (for 
Level 1 
requirements) 
are not 
permitted 
unless 
authorized by 
formal waiver. 
Waiver approval 
of critical SPFs 
requires 
justification 
based on risk 
analysis and 
implementation 
of measures to 
mitigate risk. 
Critical SPFs (for 
Level 1 
requirements) may 
be permitted but are 
minimized and 
mitigated by use of 
high reliability parts 
and additional 
testing. Essential 
spacecraft functions 
and key instruments 
are typically fully 
redundant. Other 
hardware has partial 
redundancy and/or 
provisions for 
graceful degradation. 
Critical SPFs 
(for Level 1 
requirements) 
may be 
permitted but 
are mitigated 
by use of high 
reliability 
parts, 
additional 
testing, or by 
other means. 
Single string 
and selectively 
redundant 
design 
approaches 
may be used. 
Same as 
Class C. 
We will always have some critical items (coined 
“Jesus Bolts” by Mark Mangelsdorf in our project) 
that, if they fail, the airplane will crash. We try to 
be robust, we try to identify any systems or 
components in which a single failure or 
combination of likely failures could lead to 
catastrophic results, and then design those points 
with high-reliability parts, inspections/service 
plans, etc. We are selectively redundant. 
Engineer-
ing 
Model, 
Proto-
type, 
Flight and 
Spare 
Hardware 
Engineering 
model hardware 
for new or 
modified 
designs. 
Separate 
prototype and 
flight model 
hardware. Full 
set of 
assembled and 
tested "flight 
spare" 
replacement 
units. 
Engineering model 
hardware for new or 
significantly modified 
designs. Protoflight 
hardware (in lieu of 
separate prototype 
and flight models) 
except where 
extensive 
qualification testing 
is anticipated. Spare 
(or refurbishable 
prototype) hardware 
as needed to avoid 
major program 
impact. 
Engineering 
model 
hardware for 
new designs. 
Protoflight 
hardware 
permitted (in 
lieu of 
separate 
prototype and 
flight models). 
Limited flight 
spare 
hardware (for 
long lead flight 
units). 
Limited 
engineering 
model and 
flight spare 
hardware. 
We will test components to qualify them for the 
environments they will see, but certainly not the 
airplane as a whole, until it flies. We will have 
some spares of line-replaceable units. We will 
build various mock-ups of any new equipment, 
but most of the components we are using (except 
some of the NASA systems) will be off-the-shelf 
systems. We believe the closest to us might be 
Class C, but this is one that we think should be re-
written to be more airplane-centric if we were to 
keep these kinds of tables for airplane research. 
Spares approach leans more towards Class B, but 
overall Class C is the best fit. 
Qualifica-
tion, 
Accept-
ance, and 
Proto-
flight Test 
Program 
Full formal 
qualification and 
acceptance test 
programs and 
integrated end-
to-end testing at 
all hardware 
and software 
levels. 
Formal qualification 
and acceptance test 
programs and 
integrated end-to-
end testing at all 
hardware levels. May 
use a combination of 
qualification and 
protoflight hardware. 
Qualified software 
simulators used to 
verify software and 
system. 
Limited 
qualification 
testing for new 
aspects of the 
design plus full 
acceptance 
test program. 
Testing 
required for 
verification of 
safety 
compliance 
and interface 
compatibility. 
Testing 
required 
only for 
verification 
of safety 
compliance 
and 
interface 
compatibil-
ity. 
Acceptance 
test program 
for critical 
performance 
parameters. 
We will do a number of qualification tests for 
individual components, as discussed above, and 
integrated system testing before going to flight, 
as the systems start being assembled. The 
FRR/AFSRB/Tech Brief process results in what 
could be called “formal” qualification and 
acceptance functions. We will not be doing the 
FAA-level qualification testing, such as is needed 
for getting a new avionics system TSO’d for use in 
the airplane. Since this is a one-off airplane, we 
do not need to qualify things to the same robust, 
fool-proof status that a system needs to be if 
being used in a largely uncontrolled environment 
with a large range of operator experience and 
training levels. This is another one that might use 
some re-write to make more airplaneish. We 
believe LBFD should be in the Class C/D range. 
  
  Class A Class B Class C Class D Rationale 
EEE Parts NASA Parts Selection List 
(NPSL) Level 1, Level 1 
equivalent source 
control drawings (SCDs), 
and/or requirements per 
Center Parts 
Management Plan. 
Class A requirements 
or NPS Level 2, Level 2 
equivalent SCDs, 
and/or requirements 
per Center Parts 
Management Plan. 
Class A, Class B or 
NPSL Level 3, 
Level 3 
equivalent SCDs, 
and/or 
requirements per 
Center Parts 
Management 
Plan. 
Class A, Class B, 
Class C 
requirements, 
and/or 
requirements 
per Center Parts 
management 
Plan. 
EEE Parts Plan part of the 
Performance Work Statement, 
project will be Class D. Need to 
focus on A/C quality parts. 
Reviews Full formal review 
program. Either IPAO 
external independent 
reviews or independent 
reviews managed at the 
Center level with Mission 
Directorate 
participation. Include 
formal inspections of 
software requirements, 
design, verification 
documents, and code. 
Full formal review 
program. Either IPAO 
external independent 
reviews or 
independent reviews 
managed at the 
Center level with 
Mission Directorate 
participation. Include 
formal inspections of 
software 
requirements, design, 
verification 
documents, and peer 
reviews of code. 
Full formal 
review program. 
Independent 
reviews managed 
at Center level 
with Mission 
Directorate 
participation. 
Include formal 
inspections of 
software 
requirements, 
peer reviews of 
design and code. 
Center level 
reviews with 
participation of 
all applicable 
directorates. 
May be 
delegated to 
projects. Peer 
reviews of 
software 
requirements 
and code. 
The LBFD review process is 
closest to Class C. 
Safety Per all applicable NASA 
safety directives and 
standards 
Same as Class A Same as Class A Same as Class A Same as all of them – we try to be 
a safe project within the 
accepted probability of loss 
metric, at least. Project observes 
all the applicable safety directives 
and standards. 
Materials Verify heritage of 
previously used 
materials and qualify all 
new or changed 
materials and 
applications/ 
configurations. Use 
source controls on 
procured materials and 
acceptance test each 
lot/batch. 
Use previously 
tested/flown materials 
or qualify new 
materials and 
applications/ 
configurations. 
Acceptance test each 
lot of procured 
materials. 
Use previously 
tested/flown 
materials or 
characterize new 
materials. 
Acceptance test 
sample lots of 
procured 
materials. 
Requirements 
are based on 
applicable 
safety 
standards. 
Materials should 
be assessed for 
application and 
life limits. 
We are not aware of any new 
materials in the design, so we are 
C/D. 
Reliability 
NPD 
8720.1 
Failure mode and effects 
analysis/critical items list 
(FMEA/CIL), worst-case 
performance, and parts 
electrical stress analysis 
for all parts and circuits. 
Mechanical reliability, 
human, and other 
reliability analysis where 
appropriate. 
FMEA/CIL at black box 
(or circuit block 
diagram) level as a 
minimum. Worst-case 
performance and 
parts electrical stress 
analysis for all parts 
and circuits. 
FMEA/CIL scope 
determined at 
the project level. 
Analysis of 
interfaces. Parts 
electrical stress 
analysis for all 
parts and circuits. 
Analysis 
requirements 
based on 
applicable 
safety 
requirements. 
Analysis of 
interface. 
Various systems will have 
different levels of failure effects 
analyses, depending on criticality. 
These have been somewhat 
defined in the Airworthiness 
Requirements and Criteria. We 
are in the C range. 
 Class A Class B Class C Class D Rationale 
 Fault Tree 
Analysis 
System level 
qualitative fault 
tree analysis. 
Same as Class A Same as Class A Fault tree 
analysis 
required for 
safety critical 
functions. 
Again, different systems will get different 
treatment – we expect to have some system-
level fault tree analysis, as has already been 
done to help recognize the problem children. 
So, depending on how we read the Class A 
description, we could be anywhere on the 
spectrum; Class C/D is best fit. 
Probabil-
istic Risk 
Assess-
ment NPR 
8705.5 
Full Scope, 
addressing all 
applicable end 
states per NPR 
8705.5. 
Limited Scope, 
focusing on 
mission-related 
end-states of 
specific decision 
makingdecision-
making interest 
per NPR 8705.5. 
Simplified, 
identifying major 
contributors. 
Other 
discretionary 
applications. 
Safety only. 
Other 
discretionary 
applications. 
Probability and reliability predictions will be 
done for the entire aircraft system to arrive at 
the probability of loss statistic, which we have 
set a requirement to. This involves a complex 
understanding of the interaction of the 
subsystems in the airplane and results in the 
overall PLOA, and shows the contribution to 
that from each factor in the airplane design. 
Project is most likely a Priority II, therefore 
NPR 8715.3 requires “qualitative system 
safety analysis, supplemented by probabilistic 
risk assessment where appropriate.” For 
LBFD, “where appropriate” would be the 
PLOA-related analyses. 
Maintain-
ability 
NPD 
8720.1 
As required by NPD 
8720.1 
Application of 
NPD 8720.1 
determined by 
program. 
(Typically ground 
elements only). 
Maintainability 
considered 
during design, if 
applicable. 
Requirements 
based on 
applicable 
safety 
standards. 
We have the design being conducted with a 
long flight campaign (1000 flight hours) in 
mind. Since that is the case, we are designing 
for reliability and maintainability. We are 
Class C since we are doing what we need to 
do to be able to operate for several years and 
lots of flying, so that is applicable 
Quality 
Assurance 
NPD 
8730.5, 
NPR 
8735.2 
(NPR 
8735.1) 
Formal quality 
assurance program 
including closed 
loop problem 
reporting and 
corrective action, 
configuration 
management, 
performance 
trending, and 
stringent 
surveillance. GIDEP 
failure experience 
data and NASA 
Advisory process. 
Formal quality 
assurance 
program 
including closed-
loop problem 
reporting and 
corrective action, 
configuration 
management, 
performance 
trending, and 
moderate 
surveillance. 
GIDEP failure 
experience data 
and NASA 
Advisory process. 
Formal quality 
assurance 
program 
including closed-
loop problem 
reporting and 
corrective action, 
configuration 
management, 
performance 
trending, and 
tailored 
surveillance. 
GIDEP failure 
experience data 
and NASA 
Advisory process. 
Closed-loop 
problem 
reporting and 
corrective 
action, 
configuration 
management, 
GIDEP failure 
experience 
data and 
NASA 
Advisory 
process. 
Other 
requirements 
based on 
applicable 
safety 
standards. 
There is strong collaboration between NASA 
and the contractor; we do have a quality 
assurance plan at NASA and for the 
contractor. Only difference between B and C 
seems to be moderate vs. tailored 
surveillance; Class C is the best fit. 
Software Formal project 
software assurance 
program. 
Independent 
verification and 
validation (IV&V) as 
determined by AA 
OSMA. 
Formal project 
software 
assurance 
program. IV&V as 
determined by 
AA OSMA. 
Formal project 
software 
assurance 
program. IV&V as 
determined by 
AA OSMA. 
Formal 
project 
software 
assurance 
insight. 
We do NOT plan to subject our software to 
the IV&V in West Virginia, so we are Class D. 
 Class A Class B Class C Class D Rationale 
 Risk 
Manage-
ment NPR 
8000.4b 
Risk Management Program. 
Risk reporting to GPMC. 
Same as 
Class A 
Same as 
Class A 
Same as 
Class A 
We are the Governing Program Management Council 
(GPMC) at the QueSST CCB, so looks like we can be any 
of the classes there. 
Telemetry 
Coverage 
for mission 
critical 
events 
During all mission critical 
events to assure data is 
available for critical 
anomaly investigation to 
prevent future recurrence. 
Same as 
Class A 
Same as 
Class A 
Same as 
Class A 
There are no differences in the table (should be for 
airplane projects, I would think). We will vary telemetry 
requirements based on phase of flight project and the 
objective of each individual flight. 
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